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The New York State Commission on Government Integrity 
("Commission") today issues the third in a series of reports on 
campaign financing practices in New York State. This report 
focuses on the crisis in New York City's campaign financing 
system and the City's first steps toward reforming that system. 
The Commission finds that those reforms, significant 
though they are, fall short of what is needed to remove the 
shadow cast by large private campaign contributions over the 
integrity of municipal government: a total ban on corporate 
contributions as well as on contributions from those doing 
business with the City; a prohibition on loans and loan guaran-
tees (other than in the ordinary course of the lender's business) 
in excess of the new City contribution limit; a limit on non-
election year fundraising; and the prompt modernization of the 
Board of Estimate's obsolete recordkeeping practices so that the 
public can readily monitor the extent to which contributors 
benefit from favorable action by elected officials on the Board. 
Full reform of New York City's campaign finance system 
will require state legislation. The Commission therefore renews 
its call for the prompt passage by the state legislature of a 
campaign finance reform measure that will, at long last, rank New 
York among those states which have determined that the campaigns 
of public officials are too serious a matter to place in the 
hands of the moneyed few. 
II. overview of Commission Recommendations and Recent Law 
Reform Efforts 
A. Guideposts For Reform 
on December 21, 1987, the Commission issued its first 
report on campaign financing.l Calling for sweeping reform of 
New York's campaign finance laws, the Commission unanimously 
concluded that "New,York's campaign financing laws and procedures 
are so inadequate and outmoded that they undermine public 
confidence in the honesty and integrity of government and will 
remain a public embarrassment unless and until they are re-
formed. 112 
The Commission's December report urged the state 
legislature to enact a new campaign financing law and summarized 
four key elements of reform:3 
1 Campaign Financing: Preliminarv Reoort (December 21, 
1987) (hereinafter "the December report"). This report was 
issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 88.1, paragraph II.5 
(April 21, 1987), which directs the Commission to investigate the 
adequacy of New York's "laws, regulations and procedures relating 
to campaign contributions and campaign expenditures." Copies of 
this and subsequent campaign finance reports issued by the 
Commission are available from the Commission upon request. 
2 Id. at 1-2. 
3 Id. at 7-8. 
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1. Drastically reduced campaign contribu-
tion limits and prohibitions on direct 
contributions from corporations, labor 
unions, and those doing business with 
government. · 
2. Full, detailed and timely disclosure of 
all campaign contributions and expenditures. 
3. Optional public funding of elections for 
statewide offices, coupled with carefully 
prescribed expenditure limits for those 
campaigns, and removal of state law barriers 
to public funding for local elections. 
4. Creation of a new, adequately funded 
Campaign Financing Enforcement Agency with 
extensive powers to implement and enforce 
campaign financing laws and regulations. 
In a second report, The Albany Money Machine: Campaign 
Financing For New York State Legislative Races 4 , the Commission 
highlighted the disproportionate role played by corporate, 
business and union contributors in funding state political party 
committees and legislative elections and renewed its call for the 
enactment of strengthened campaign disclosure laws, drastically 
reduced contribution limits and the establishment of a strong, 
independent enforcement agency. 
Unfortunately, that call remains unheeded. While a 
significant reform bill passed the State Assembly on February 22, 
1988, there has been no parallel action in the State Senate. At 
4 Copies of this August 1988 report are available from the 
Commission. 
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the state level, therefore, it is business as usual: individuals 
may still contribute up to $40,000 for statewide general 
elections and up to $150,000 per year for all political pur-
poses5; corporate executives, law firm partners and other 
business associates may still conceal their business affiliation 
by providing only their home address on the state-mandated 
campaign contribution disclosure form; and candidates may still 
solicit and spend unlimited amounts of money -- much of it raised 
from individuals and businesses seeking various government 
benefits --to seek elected office. 
B. New York City's New Campaign Finance Act 
In contrast, the New York City Council took an 
important step toward campaign financing reform with the 
enactment of the New York City Campaign Finance Act (hereinafter 
"the Campaign Finance Act" or "the Act").6 This law, which 
allows candidates to choose to accept partial public funding of 
their campaigns, incorporates several aspects of campaign 
financing reform advocated by the Commission in its December 
report. The amount which individuals may contribute during one 
election cycle to candidates for citywide office who choose the 
5 N.Y. Elec. Law §14-114(8) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 1988). 
6 Local Law 8 of 1988 (to be codified at New York Cityi N.Y. 
Admin. Code §§3-701 to 714) was signed into law by Mayor Koch on 
February 29, 1988. 
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public funding option is lowered from $100,000 to $6,ooo.7 
Contributors to those who elect public funding must, for the 
first time, disclose not only their home address but also their 
occupation, employer, bus.iness address and the name, occupation, 
employer and business address of any intermediary who solicited 
their contribution.a 
As public hearings held by the Commission on March 14 
and 15 and June 20, 1988 revealed,9 the abuses at which the 
Campaign Finance Act's contribution limits are aimed are real and 
widespread. Many individual contributors, including those who 
have had business pending before the Board of Estimate, have 
contributed tens of thousands of dollars to the citywide can-
didates. lo Their contributions, in the future, will be limited to 
7 N.Y.C. Admin. Code §3-703(1) (f). Specifically, the 
contribution limit for the three citywide officials is $3,000 for 
the primary and $3,000 for the general election. For borough 
presidents, the new limit is $2,500 per election: for City 
Council members, the figure is $2,000 per election. 
8 Id. §3-703 (6). 
9 The Commission hearings are cited below as "March 14 
Tr.", "March 15 Tr." and "June Tr.", respectively. Transcripts 
of those hearings are available for copying from the Commission. 
lO Thirty-seven individuals who each contributed $10,000 
or more during the period from January 1, 1983 through January 1, 
1986 accounted for 31% of the contributions received by Andrew J. 
Stein in his 1985 race for City Council President: twenty-eight 
individuals who each contributed $10,000 or more accounted for 
25% of the contributions received by Comptroller Harrison J. 
Goldin during that period: fifty-two individuals who each 
contributed $10,000 or more accounted for 18% of the contribu-
tions received by Edward I. Koch. A further breakdown of 
contributions to the three citywide officeholders is included in 
Appendix A. 
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$6,000 to candidates who accept public funding.11 
The New York City Campaign Finance Act also provides a 
much needed tightening of disclosure requirements. The Commis-
sion staff has identified numerous clusters of contributions 
which, because they were each made on the same day and for 
similar amounts of money, appear to have been "bundled", i.e., 
solicited by one or more key intermediaries. Because state law 
does not require contributors to disclose either their employer 
or their business address, it has frequently been impossible to 
determine from the face of a campaign disclosure statement the 
common thread to contributions and what special business 
interests they represent.12 Thanks to the new disclosure 
requirements contained in the New York City law, the public will 
11 Information on candidates' contributions compiled by the 
Commission from the New York City Board of Elections' records for 
the period January 1, 1983 through January 1, 1986 shows that 
over one-third (36%) of the money raised by Council President 
Stein during that period came from individuals who contributed 
$6000 or more to his campaign. Mayor Koch and Comptroller Goldin 
raised, respectively, 20% and 28% of their contributions from 
individuals who contributed $6000 or more. 
12 Only by going beyond the face of the filings has the 
Commission been able to lay bare the common element in many of 
those cases. Thus, for instance, the Commission determined by 
investigation that twenty-five contributions of $1,000 each 
received by Comptroller Goldin's Committee for a Better 
Government, Inc. on February 8, 1985 were made by executives of 
Bear Stearns, June Tr. at 193-94 & Exh. 57; so too were nineteen 
individual contributions totaling over $23,500 made on December 
11, 1984 to New Yorkers for Koch 1 85. Twenty-one partners in the 
law firm of Proskauer, Rose, Goetz & Mendelsohn jointly 
contributed $8,600 to New Yorkers for Koch 1 89 on December 17, 
1987; fifty Kidder Peabody executives contributed $22,800 to 
Comptroller Goldin on July 19, 1985 and September 17, 1985 from 
locations scattered across the United States. 
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at last be able to discern from the filings themselves the 
business affiliation and possible special interests of each 
contributor. 
Significant as the new contribution limits and 
disclosure requirements contained in the Campaign Finance Act 
are, they constitute only a partial reform. 
First, the reduced contribution limits and disclosure 
requirements apply only to candidates who accept public fund-
ing .13 Under the Act, candidates who reject public funding are 
not bound by the new limits or disclosure rules, and are free to 
accept individual contributions up to the maximum allowed by 
state law -- for citywide office, $50,000 for the primary and 
$50,000 for the general election -- without disclosing the 
contributor's business affiliation. 
Second, even for candidates who agree to abide by the 
new rules, major loopholes undermine the effectiveness of those 
rules. Despite the new $3,000 contribution limit, corporations 
can still make virtually unlimited contributions through gifts 
13 The Commission recognizes the concern of the drafters of 
the new law that the current legal authority of the City to set 
contribution limits lower than those contained in state law, 
except as a condition of accepting public funds, is subject to 
question. Full reform requires state legislation. See 
generally, R. Briffault, Report To The Charter Revision 
Commission Concerning A Local Campaign Finance Charter Amendment 
(June 11, 1987). 
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from multiple subsidiaries and affiliates. Candidates may accept 
loans without regard to the new contribution limits, provided 
they are repaid prior to the next election. They may accept 
multiple gifts under $3,000 from an unlimited number of corporate 
executives or law firm partners, even if the contributor's 
employer or firm does business with the City. And candidates are 
still free to hold fundraisers and accept contributions through-
out the entire four-year election cycle, thus perpetuating the 
vicious cycle of spiraling campaign costs and fundraising. 
c. outline of Commission Recommendations 
This third Commission report examines in detail these 
weaknesses in the new law, drawing upon the evidence from its 
public hearings in March and June 198814 and the fruits of its 
investigations and staff research. Passage of state legislation 
along the lines suggested in the Commission's December report 
remains imperative. In the interim, the Commission urges the 
prompt passage of an amendment to the New York City Campaign 
Finance Act which would ban corporate contributions and contribu-
tions from those doing business with the City; prohibit loans and 
loan guarantees (other than in the ordinary course of the 
lender's business) in excess of $3,000 per election; and prevent 
candidates from accepting contributions more than 15 months 
l4 A list of witnesses for the March and June hearings is 
attached hereto as Appendix B. 
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before the primary election. Finally, the Commission calls upon 
the City to pursue aggressively the modernization of the Board of 
Estimate's recordkeeping practices so that the public can readily 
monitor the extent to which contributors benefit from favorable 
action by elected City officials on the Board. 
III. New York City's Campaign Finance Law Must Be Strengthened. 
A. Corporate Contributions Should Be Banned 
Current state law limits a corporation's contributions 
to all candidates combined to $5,000 per calendar year.15 As the 
commission hearings revealed, this corporate contribution limit 
is so easily evaded that it is a limit in name only. Testimony 
at the Commission's hearings in March revealed striking examples 
of wealthy contributors who made contributions far in excess of 
$5,000 by directing multiple contributions of $5,000 or less from 
the many corporations they contro1.l6 
15 N.Y. Election Law §14-116(2) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 
1988) . 
16 For example, real estate developer Gerald Guterman 
contributed a total of $100,000 to Comptroller Goldin's campaign 
committee between December 27, 1984 and January 4, 1985 through 
21 corporations he controlled (March 14 Tr. at 229-35); Donald 
Trump contributed $30,000 to Council President Stein through 17 
corporations on August 29, 1985; three corporations controlled by 
Robert Pressman and his family contributed $15,000 to Mayor 
Koch's 1985 campaign on April 28, 1985. 
The channeling of large contributions through multiple 
corporations is by no means restricted to the real estate 
(continued ... ) 
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Perhaps the most striking example of the ease with 
which the spirit of the corporate contribution limit can be 
' 
circumvented is illustrated by testimony at the Commission's 
March 14, 1988 hearing. Responding to a solicitation at a 
private luncheon to which he had been invited by Comptroller 
Goldin, real estate developer Joseph Bernstein testified that he 
made a $25,000 contribution in Febrµary 1984 to Goldin's 
Committee for a Better Government through his corporation, the 
New York Land Company.17 Nine months later, on or about November 
15, 1984, the Committee for a Better Government refunded the 
$25,000 to Mr. Bernstein.18 Within a matter of days, the New 
York Land Company had repackaged the $25,000 contribution and 
forwarded five checks from five different corporate affiliates 
totaling $25,000 to the Committee for a Better Government.19 
Merely lowering the corporate limit from $5,000 to 
16 ( ••. continued) 
industry. On December 28, 1984, Drexel Burnham Lambert forwarded 
five checks to Comptroller Goldin's Committee for a Better 
Government, each in the amount of $5,000, from five separate 
Drexel affiliates (March 14 Tr. at 91 & Exh. 18); four af-
filiates of Prudential Bache, Inc. contributed $20,000 to Mayor 
Koch on September 23, 1985; four affiliates of Shearson Lehman 
Brothers contributed $19,000 to Comptroller Goldin on August 29, 
1985 (March 14 Tr. 97-98 & Exh. 21) and $10,000 to Mayor Koch on 
January 13, 1988. June Tr. at 21~22 & Exh. 27. 
Overall, corporate contributions accounted for 29% of 
the contributions raised by Mayor Koch, 28% of the contributions 
raised by Council President Stein and 33% of the contributions 
raised by Comptroller Goldin for the 1985 election. 
17 March 14 Tr. at 132-34. 
18 Id. at 138-39. 
19 Id. at 139. See also March 14 Tr. at 88-91. 
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$3,000, as New York City's Campaign Finance Act does, will not 
diminish the amount of money which corporate contributors can 
pour into campaigns. Mayor Koch, for instance, voluntarily 
imposed a $3,000 limit on corporate contributions to his December 
1987 annual fundraising dinner. Nonetheless, as testimony at our 
June hearings revealed, corporate contributors in some cases gave 
exactly as much after the $3,000 limit was imposed as they had 
given when there was a $5,000 corporate limit: they merely 
increased the number of affiliates through which the contribu-
tions were made.20 
The new City Campaign Finance Act, like the Mayor's 
voluntary restrictions, limits corporate contributions to $3,000. 
But, as the Mayor testified before the Commission in June:21 
There's great debate as to whether or not the 
existing language of the law would preclude 
subsidiaries or affiliates [I]t's the 
belief of some of us that the law does not 
preclude the subsidiaries but if it does not 
directly, then we believe that [the Campaign 
Finance Board], which has been created under 
the law, would have the right to define the 
subsidiaries as one person and, therefore, 
20 Five separate subsidiaries of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 
for instance, contributed $20,000 to the Mayor's campaign on a 
single day in 1985. In 1987, Merrill Lynch subsidiaries again 
contributed $20,000 to the Mayor, only this time the 
contributions came from seven separate subsidiaries. June Tr. 
at 22; Exh. 25. Real estate developer Bernard Mendik, who, 
together with his wife, individually contributed $15,000 to the 
Mayor in 1985, contributed $16,000 to the Mayor in 1987: $2,000 
each from Bernard Mendik and his wife individually and a total of 
$12, 000 from four Mendik-aff iliated corporate entities. June 
· Tr. at 23; Exh. 29. 
21 June Tr. at 18-19. 
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subject to the limitation. 
don't have that legal right ... 
they make that recommendation, 
Council would abide by it. 
And if they 
we would hope 
and then the 
Despite the ambiguity in the Campaign Finance Act, 
Mayor Koch made a commitment at the Commission's June hearing 
that his campaign committee would not accept more than a total of 
$3,000 from a corporation and its subsidiaries combined.22 Later 
that week, Comptroller Goldin announced that he would not accept 
any corporate contributions (or corporate PAC contributions) for 
the 1989 municipal elections.23 
While the Commission is encouraged by these self-
imposed fundraising restraints, we are mindful that these 
voluntary restraints are just that voluntary. Neither the 
Campaign Finance Act nor the proposed charter amendment dealing 
with public fundraising includes a ban on either corporate 
contributions or on contributions from multiple corporate 
affiliates and subsidiaries. 
The federal government has long prohibited corporations 
22 June Tr. at 20, 86. On March 16, 1988, two weeks after 
the Campaign Finance Act went into effect, New Yorkers for Koch 
1989 accepted $15,000 in contributions from six corporations 
controlled by Robert Pressman and his family. Twelve thousand 
dollars of those contributions were refunded by the campaign 
committee on July 6, 1988, following the Mayor's testimony at the 
Commission's June hearing. 
23 Letter from New York City Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin 
to Commission Chairman John D. Feerick dated June 24, 1988, on 
file with the Commission. 
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from making financial contributions to candidates for federal 
office.24 A similar ban is in effect in more than a dozen 
states.25 As the United States Supreme Court ruled in upholding 
the federal ban on- corporate contributions, "substantial 
aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages which go 
with the corporate form of organization should not be converted 
into political •war chests' which could be used to incur 
political debts from legislators who are aided by the contribu-
tions.1126 
24 See 2 U.S.C. §441b(a) and (b) (2), which prohibit a 
corporation from making "any direct or indirect payment, 
distribution, loan, advance, deposit or gift of money or any 
services •••• to any candidate, campaign committee, or political 
party or organization, in connection with any election to any of 
the off ices referred to in this section " 
25 Alabama - Ala. Code §10-2A-70.1 (1987); Arizona - Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. Ann. §16-919 (Supp. 1987); Iowa - Iowa Code Ann. 
§56.29 (West Supp. 1988); Kentucky - Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. §121.025 
(Supp. 1987); Massachusetts - Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 55, §8 (Law Co-
op. Supp. 1988); Michigan - Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. §169.254 (West 
Supp. 1988); Minnesota - Minn. Stat. Ann. §210A.34 (West Supp. 
1988); Montana - Mont. Code Ann. §13-35-227 (1987); New Jersey -
N.J. Stat. Ann. §19:34-45 (West Supp. 1988); North Carolina -
N.C. Gen. Stat. §163-269 (1987); North Dakota - N.D.- Cent. Code 
§16.1-08-02 (Supp. 1987); Ohio - Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §3599.03 
(Baldwin 1988); Oklahoma - Okla. Const. Art. 9, §40 (Supp. 1988); 
Tennessee - Tenn. Code Ann. §2-19-132 (1987); Texas - Tex. Elec. 
Code Ann. §251.010 (Vernon 1987); West Virginia - W. Va. Code 
§3-8-8 (Supp. 1988); Wisconsin - Wisc. Stat. Ann. §11.38 (West 
1987); Wyoming - Wyo. Stat. §22-25-102 (Supp. 1988). Of these 
states, Alabama prohibits contributions only from public 
utilities and Massachusetts and New Jersey prohibit contributions 
from banks, trust companies, surety companies, insurance 
companies and public utilities. 
26 Federal Electiori Commission v. National Right to Work 
Committee, 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982). 
An additional reason for the prohibition of corporate 
campaign contributions was recently advanced by the Kings County 
(continued ... ) 
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The Commission reaffirms its recommendation that a 
total ban be imposed on corporate contributions similar to the 
ban on corporate contributions in effect both at the federal 
level and in numerous other states. 
B. Loans Should Be Limited To The Same Extent 
As Contributions 
In today's media intensive campaigns, candidates are 
often confronted with the last minute need to cover very large 
media bills. For this and other purposes, loans provide a way to 
raise large sums of money in a relatively short period of time. 
Although loans may provide quick infusions of cash, 
they may also have lingering adverse side effects. Elected 
officials often end up in the untenable position of owing vast 
sums of money to persons or entities that do business with the 
City. This ethical dilemma is only compounded by a lack of 
meaningful disclosure since the financial disclosure statements 
promulgated by the State Board of Elections do not require the 
26( ..• continued) 
District Attorney, Elizabeth Holtzman. In a report on campaign 
practices in Brooklyn elections, Ms. Holtzman pointed out that 
"one of the major problems posed by [corporate] contributions is 
that they can conceal the identity of the real contributor" since 
"[c]orporations may be less reluctant than individuals to allow 
themselves to be used to funnel another's contribution into a 
campaign." E. Holtzman, Report on Campaign Practices in Brooklyn 
Elections in Recent Years (August 17, 1988) at 9-10. 
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disclosure of clear or comprehensive information relating to loan 
transactions.27 
Andrew Stein's 1985 campaign for City Council President 
is a case in point. During the course of that campaign, Stein 
1 85 (Mr. Stein's authorized political committee) borrowed 
approximately $1.2 million. Of this sum, approximately $300,000 
was borrowed directly from twelve individuals or entities. 28 An 
additional $900,000 was borrowed from commercial banks and 
guaranteed by twenty-three Stein supporters.29 
27 State disclosure forms are not designed to report 
complicated loan transactions. With respect to loans taken, the 
disclosure statement mandates that debt instruments be attached 
and guarantors identified. With respect to loan repayments, 
however, there is no such requirement. Rather, the forms merely 
call for the date and amount of the loan repayment, along with 
the name and address of the lender. Accordingly, where guaran-
tors rather than the campaign committee repay the loans, the 
forms provide little meaningful disclosure. 
28 For instance, between January 31, 1986 and August 21, 
1986, Stein '85 borrowed a total of $180,000 from three in-
dividuals and one law firm associated with Telecom Plus of New 
York City, Inc. June Tr. at 114-15. According to City records, 
Council President Stein voted on June 30, 1986 to approve a $1.29 
million City contract between the City Department of General 
Services and Telecom Plus for the purchase and installation of 
telephones and switching equipment. See Calendar of the Board of 
Estimate, June 30, 1986, no. 435. Stein testified at the 
Commission's hearing in June that he "had absolutely no idea that 
these people had anything in any way, shape or form, to do with 
the Board of Estimate when I was getting help from them." June 
Tr. at 114. 
29 Stein 1 85 obtained guarantees for $200,000 from the same 
three individuals and law firm associated with City vendor Telcom 
Plus. See footnote 28 above. An . additional $300,000 of Stein 
'85's loans were guaranteed by six major New York City real 
estate developers. 
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Today, three years later, much of that debt remains 
outstanding. Although over $800,000 of the more than $900,000 
borrowed from commercial banks has been repaid, more than half, 
approximately $500,000, was repaid to the banks by the individual 
guarantors, many of whom, like real estate developers Donald 
Trump and William Zeckendorf, do business with New York City.30 
Of the more than $300,000 borrowed directly from individuals, 
only $50,000 has been repaid -- including a $15,000 repayment to 
the candidate himself. Thus, as of Stein '85's most recent 
disclosure statement of July 15, 1988, the campaign still has 
more than $334,000 in loans outstanding. Once again, much of 
this debt is owed to persons or entities that do business with 
New York City. 
New York City's Campaign Finance Act largely fails to 
address these problems. First, contributors may make loans 
without regard to the Act's contribution limits. Only to the 
extent that such loans are not repaid prior to the next election 
are they deemed contributions subject to the Act's applicable 
limits. 31 Moreover, even if an excessive loan is not timely 
repaid, it is unlikely that the candidate will be seriously 
penalized. Criminal penalties are available only if it can be 
30 In some instances, although they originally expected only 
to guarantee the loan, guarantors found themselves actually 
repaying sums outstanding. See, ~, testimony of William 
Zeckendorf, March 14 Tr. pp. 215-217; Gerald Guterman, id. at 
pp. 238-39; Donald Trump, id. at pp. 254-55. 
31 N Y C Ad ' d 
. • . min. Coe §3-702(8). 
- 16 -
proven that, at the time the loan was taken, the candidate had no 
intention of repaying it.32 Otherwise, the only penalty imposed 
by the Act is a civil fine not to exceed $10,000.33 
Second, a provision of the campaign Finance Act 
specifically added by the City Council -- there was no cor-
responding provision in the Mayor's proposed legislation --
allows liabilities outstanding on the effective date of the new 
law to be paid off with contributions subject only to the State's 
appallingly high contribution limits.34 Such spending is also 
deemed separate from the candidate's regulated expenditures. 
These provisions present a serious loophole in the new 
law and subvert the law's attempts to diminish the influence of 
large contributors. Although prevented from directly making 
large contributions, individuals can still bankroll campaigns 
through excessively large loans. 
The Commission believes that these weaknesses in the 
new City Campaign Finance Act can be addressed only by prohibit-
ing all loans and loan guarantees (except in the ordinary course 
of the lender's business) in excess of contribution limits. 
Loans must be recognized for what they are -- another form of 
32 Id. §3-711(3). 
33 Id. §3-711(1). 
34 Id. §3-712. 
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contribution. 
C. The Need For Limits on Contributions From Those 
Who Benefit From Discretionary City Decisions 
1. City Officials Are Heavily Dependent on 
Contributions From Those Over Whom They 
Exercise Discretion 
The three citywide officials may vote to grant or 
withhold an enormous range of financial benefits. As members of 
the Board of Estimate, they vote on zoning variances and tax 
abatements for developers; they approve or disapprove lucrative 
contracts for engineering, financial and legal services; they 
vote to ratify or reject multi-million dollar leases for City 
offices. 
The Commission's hearings dramatically illustrated the 
extent to which the three citywide officials seek out and are 
dependent upon contributions from those industries whose members 
may do business with the City. Fully one-half of the campaign 
funds raised by Andrew Stein in his 1985 race for the presidency 
of the City Council were made by contributors from four in-
dustries whose members frequently come before the Board of 
Estimate: real estate, financial services, legal services and 
construction and engineering. Over forty percent of the 
Comptroller's financial base in 1985 was comprised of contribu-
tions from firms and employees in just two industries: real 
estate and financial services. These same two industries 
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accounted for a quarter of the Mayor's fundraising receipts for 
the 1985 election.35 
Those who stand to benefit from favorable City 
decisions are intimately involved in the fundraising process in 
New York City. The dinner committee list for the Mayor's 
December 1987 fundraising event -- a list of those upon whom the 
Mayor's fundraising organization depends for the sale of tickets 
to the fundraising dinner36 -- includes the names of many who do 
business with the City on a large-scale basis.37 Prominent real 
35 These percentages of interest group contributions are 
minimums. While we have been able to identify certain con-
tributors as members or representatives of various industries 
and have included them in these percentages, we have not been 
able to identify all individuals employed or affiliated with 
those industries who may well have similar interests at stake, 
and whose contributions may in fact have been solicited or even 
orchestrated by their employers. The disclosure forms promul-
gated by the State Board of Elections do not require information 
concerning a contributor's occupation or employer -- a failure 
which we strongly believe must be rectified at the State level if 
the public is to be adequately informed. 
36 See March 14 Tr. at pp. 29-31 & Exh. 2. 
37 For example, Bernard Mendik, whose name appears on the 
Mayor's dinner committee list, leases a number of substantial 
properties to the City; as recently as June 30, 1987 the Board of 
Estimate approved a two-year lease at $4,962,654 per year 
between the City and a Mendik affiliate. See Board of Estimate 
resolution dated June 30, 1987, Calendar No. 117. Joseph Pinto, 
also on the Mayor's 1987 dinner committee list, is a vice 
president of Manuel Elken Co., P.C., a firm of consulting 
engineers, whose engineering consulting contracts with the City 
repeatedly come before the Board of Estimate for approval. Se~ 
Board of Estimate resolutions dated May 21, 1987 (Calendar No. 
264); February 11, 1988 (Calendar No. 191); February 25, 1988 
(Calendar No. · 261). 
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estate developers, investment bankers, and lobbyists38 whose 
firms or clients have had or can reasonably expect to have 
business dealings with the City, have lent their names and, in 
many instances, their active support, to the Mayor's fundraising 
efforts. 
As a number of witnesses have testified, those who have 
had or who could reasonably be expected to have business before 
the Board have been vigorously courted by candidates. Real 
estate developer Joseph Bernstein testified that he received 
personal telephone calls from Harrison Goldin, Andrew Stein and 
Kenneth Lipper (then a candidate for City Council President) 
seeking to enlist his financial support for the 1985 election.39 
38 Numerous attorneys who appear on the Mayor's dinner 
committee list--Howard Hornstein, Victor Marrero, Peter 
Piscitelli, Peter Tufo, John Zuccotti, to name a few--are also 
registered lobbyists who appear on behalf of clients before 
various City agencies and officials. At the Commission's hearing 
in June, Howard J. Rubenstein, a prominent public relations 
figure and lobbyist who was a member of the Mayor's 1987 dinner 
committee, announced that he would no longer raise campaign funds 
for any public official before whom he might appear and that he 
would support legislation barring lobbyists from raising funds 
for any officials or legislators whom they lobbied. June Tr. at 
pp. 280-82. As Mr. Rubenstein testified: 
I came to the conclusion that this 
appearance, not the substantive fact, but the 
appearance of a lobbyist raising money, 
substantial or otherwise, for people before 
whom they appear was not appropriate ..• [I]t 
was there, that appearance that perhaps the 
lobbyist was gaining an undue advantage, or 
a position that was perhaps not in the public 
interest. 
June Tr. at pp. 281-82. 
39 March 14 Tr. at pp. 128-133. 
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According to Mr. Bernstein, both Mr. Lipper and Mr. Goldin were 
. 
explicit in their fundraising demands: in a meeting in Mr. 
Bernstein's office, Mr. Lipper asked Mr. Bernstein for a 
contribution of $10,00o. 4° Comptroller Goldin, who invited Mr. 
Bernstein and his brother to lunch at the Plaza Hotel, told Mr. 
Bernstein in the course of that lunch that "he thought that a 
contribution of $50,000, $25,000 for each of two years, would be 
appropriate. 11 41 Real estate developer William Zeckendorf, who in 
1986 had several major development projects that required Board 
approval, echoed the same theme: the contributions he has made to 
Council President Stein were the result, for the most part, of 
personal solicitations from the candidate.42 
During the June hearings, the Commission explored with 
Comptroller Goldin contributions aggregating $25,000 which he 
received on February 8, 1985 from twenty-five executives of Bear, 
Stearns & Co., Inc. 4 3 The Comptroller acknowledged that he had 
discussed the collection and delivery of these contributions 
with Alan Greenberg, Bear Stearns' chief executive officer.44 
40 March 14 Tr. at pp. 129-30. 
41 March 14 Tr. at p. 132. 
42 March 14 Tr. at pp. 213-14, 218-19. 
43 June Tr. at pp. 193-196. The filings themselves contain 
only the contributor's name and home address. The fact that the 
contributors in question were executives of Bear Stearns is not 
apparent from the filings. The identity of the contributors nad 
to be independ€ntly determined by the Commission's staff. 
44 June Tr. at 195-96. 
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Bear Stearns has been, for a number of years, a member of the 
team of investment banking firms selected to underwrite the 
City's general obligation bonds. More recently, the Board of 
Estimate voted to ~pprove a one-year $430,000 contract for Bear 
Stearns to serve as an investment advisor to the New York City 
Police Pension Fund.45 
The Mayor and the Comptroller are both vested with 
substantial independent discretion, separate and apart from the 
discretion they exercise as members of the Board of Estimate. 
For instance, without review by the Board of Estimate, they 
jointly select the team of investment banking firms that 
underwrite billions of dollars of New York City general obliga-
tion bonds.46 Sixteen firms were recently selected to serve as 
the underwriting syndicate for the distribution of City bonds. 
Fourteen of these firms and/or their employees contributed over 
$260,000 to the Comptroller's 1985 re-election campaign in 1984 
and 1985: twelve of these firms and/or their employees con-
tributed over $150,000 to the Mayor's 1985 re-election cam-
45 Board of Estimate Calendar No. 148, April 30, 1987. The 
following year, on April 28, 1988, the Board of Estimate voted 
11-0 to approve a $125,000 contract for Bear Stearns to serve as 
investment advisor to the New York City Fire Pension Fund. 
46 Both the Mayor and the Comptroller testified that they 
delegate the selection of underwriters to their staff. June Tr. 
at 27, 198. However, both officials retain the power to confirm 
-- or reject -- their staff recommendations. Id. 
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paign. 47 Such large contributions to the two public officials 
charged by law with the final authority for the selection of bond 
underwriters raise troubling appearances of influence seeking. 
2. Existing Limits on Contributions To Board of 
Estimate Members Are Inadequate. 
In an effort to address the problem of the real or 
apparent influence of large contributions from those with 
business before the Board of Estimate, the New York state 
election law was amended in July 1986. The so-called Goodman 
amendment does not altogether ban contributions by those doing 
business with the City. Rather, it prohibits those whose 
business transactions with New York City require approval by the 
Board of Estimate from making contributions or loans in excess of 
$3,000 to a member of the Board six months before or twelve 
months after the Board officially considers the transaction.48 
The same prohibition applies to partners, corporate officers and 
5% shareholders whose partnership or corporation has business 
pending before the Board. 
However well-intentioned, the Goodman amendment has 
47 In contrast, Council President Stein, who has no role in 
the selection of bond underwriters, received less than $40,000 in 
contributions from four of the investment banking firms and/or 
their employees for his City Council President race; $31,500 of 
those contributions were made by employees of a single firm, Bear 
Stearns & Co., Inc. 
48 N.Y. Election Law §14-114(9) (a) (McKinney 1978 & Supp. 
1988) . 
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several major loopholes. The $3,000 limit contained in the 
Goodman amendment is not an aggregate limit: no matter how 
numerous they may be, partners, corporate officers and corporate 
affiliates -of the entity with business pending before the Board 
may each give up to $3,000 for an unlimited tota1.49 
The Goodman Amendment's treatment of contributions 
from partnerships--a common form of doing business among lawyers 
and real estate developers--is also problematic. For instance, 
on October 20, 1986, the law firm of Shea & Gould made a $5,000 
contribution to New Yorkers for Koch •as.SO A question was 
subsequently raised as to the propriety of that contribution 
under the Goodman amendment, coming as it did four months before 
the Board of Estimate's calendaring on February 26, 1987 of a 
contract between Shea & Gould and the New York City Off-Track 
Betting Corporation. 
Shea & Gould sought and obtained an opinion from the New 
49 Thus, for instance, the Board of Estimate approved a 
$430,000 contract for Bear Stearns to serve as investment advisor 
to the New York City Police Pension Fund on April 30, 1987. In 
December 1987, less than twelve months after the Board of 
Estimate vote, Bear Stearns & Co., Inc., its political action 
committee, an affiliated company and an officer contributed an 
aggregate of $8,000 to Mayor Koch. Three Citicorp-related 
entities contributed $9,000 to Mayor Koch on December 24, 1987, 
less than three weeks before the Board of Estimate voted to 
approve a special permit application for a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Citibank. 
SO New Yorkers For Koch 1985, Inc. 's January lS, 1987 
financial disclosure statement reveals that Shea & Gould had 
previously contributed $2S,OOO to the committee. 
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York State Board of Elections, 51 which left open the possibility 
that as long as an individual partner's proportionate share of 
the partnership contribution, together with his or her individual 
contributions, does not exceed $3,000, there is no Goodman 
amendment violation. 52 Nonetheless, New Yorkers for Koch '85 
refunded $2,000 of Shea & Gould's $5,000 contribution on May 28, 
1987. It does not appear, however that other partnership 
contributions have been treated similarly.53 
51 See New York State Board of Elections Formal Opinion #1, 
(May 15, 1987). 
52 This interpretation seems at odds with the plain language 
of the Goodman amendment which prohibits any "person, corpora-
tion, joint stock association or partnership" from making a 
contribution or loan in excess of $3,000 to Board of Estimate 
candidates and which requires any "person, corporation, joint 
stock association or partnership which has made a contribution or 
loan in excess of $3,000" to report the contribution to the 
Secretary of the Board. Election Law §14-114(9) (a) and (c). 
53 According to its July 15, 1988 campaign finance 
disclosure statement, Mayor Koch's campaign committee has not 
refunded any portion of a $5,000 contribution from the law firm 
of Robinson, Silverman, Pearce, Aronsohn & Berman which was made 
on December 10, 1987, three months before the Board of Estimate 
voted on March 10, 1988 to approve a $30,000 contract between the 
law firm and the Teacher's Retirement System. See Calendar of the 
Board of Estimate, March 10, 1988, no. 271. Nor, according to 
his recent disclosure statements, has Council President Stein 
refunded any portion of the $6,000 contributed by the law firm of 
Brown & Wood in three $2,000 installments which each fell within 
the 18-month window surrounding the Board of Estimate's approval 
on January 22, 1987 of a $2.64 million contract for Brown & Wood 
to serve as the City's bond counsel. 
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3. The Solicitation and Acceptance of Contributions 
From Those Who Do Business With the City Should 
Be Altogether Banned 
The legality of the acceptance of campaign contribu-
tions from those who do business with the city was challenged in 
a recent lawsuit brought against New Yorkers for Koch '85. In 
DiLucia v. Mandelker,54 the New York Court of Appeals rejected 
the contention that Mayor Koch's receipt of contributions from 
those interested directly or indirectly in business dealings with 
New York City violated a ban on the acceptance of gifts contained 
in the city Charter.55 The Court relied, in part, on an opinion 
by the New York City Board of Ethics which concluded that a 
campaign contribution does not constitute a "gift'' within the 
meaning of the Charter. 
54 68 N.Y. 2d 844, 508 N.Y.S. 2d 424 (1986), aff'g 110 A.D. 
2d 260, 493 N.Y.S. 2d 769 (1st Dept. 1985). 
55 Section 2604 of the New York City Charter provides in 
pertinent part: 
b. No member of the board of estimate or the council or 
other salaried officer or employee of the city or any 
city agency: ..• (3) shall accept any valuable gift, 
whether in the form of service, loan, thing or promise, 
or in any other form, from any person, firm, 
corporation or other entity which to his knowledge is 
interested directly or indirectly in any manner 
whatsoever in any such business dealings. 
*** 
d. As used in this chapter, the words "business 
dealings with the city" shall include any contract, 
service, work or business with, any sale, renting or 
other disposition to, any purchase, leasing, or other 
acquisition from, and any grant, license, permit or 
other privilege from, the city or any city agency, and 
any performance of or litigation with respect to any of 
the foregoing. 
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The Court was not called upon to reach the underlying 
ethical question and so did not address it. There is, however, 
language in that Board of Ethics opinion which the Commission 
finds both prescient and persuasive on this crucial issue. While 
acceptance of campaign contributions from those interested in 
business dealings may not currently be illegal, it is, as the 
Board of Ethics rightly concluded, unethica1.56 The Commission 
shares the Board of Ethics' view that the solicitation and 
acceptance of contributions from those who do business with the 
City offends proper ethical standards, and seconds the Board of 
Ethics's call for the prompt enactment of legislation to prohibit 
the solicitation and acceptance of such contributions. In the 
Board's words: 
The solicitation of funds for political 
purposes by a public official from those 
whose matters come before him or his agency 
for official action is offensive to proper 
ethical standards •.• 
[T]he solicitation and acceptance of 
political contributions by public officers 
from persons, firms or corporations doing 
business with government with which these 
public officers and employees are connected 
is against the public interest and should be 
prohibited .•• 
It is our recommendation that appropriate 
legislation be enacted on all levels of 
government to deal effectively with conduct 
that now is contrary to proper standards but 
56 See Opinion No. 35, New York City Board of Ethics (Oct . 
5, 1961). 
- 27 -
is not prohibited by law.57 
The Commission believes that the "appropriate legisla-
tion" needed to address this situation is two-pronged: a ban on 
the solicitation of campaign contributions from those who have 
business dealings with the City, and a ban on the making of 
contributions by those who have business dealings with the City. 
a. A Ban On Soliciting Contributions 
Under federal law, it is unlawful for any person 
"knowingly to solicit" a campaign contribution from a government 
contractor.SB The Commission recommends that municipal officers 
and employees in New York City, including elected officials, be 
similarly prohibited from soliciting, directly or indirectly, 
57 Id at pp.24-25. In its formal opinion no. 135, the Board 
of Ethics reiterated its call for the enactment of legislation to 
prohibit such contributions: 
It is also our opinion that the acceptance of funds by 
a public officer, even though unsolicited and not 
prohibited by law, from persons who have an interest in 
matters which come before him or his agency for 
official action is also offensive to proper ethical 
standards. 
We repeat our previous recommendation that appropriate 
legislation should be enacted to deal effectively with 
conduct that is contrary to proper ethical standards 
but not now prohibited by law. 
New York City Board of Ethics Opinion No. 135 (June 6, 1969). 
58 2 u.s.c. §441c(a) (2). Cf. Deering's California Codes Ann. 
§84308(b) (prohibiting solicitation and acceptance of 
contributions in excess of $250 from participants in various 
agency proceedings). 
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campaign contributions from any person who has, or within the 
previous twelve months has had, any business dealings with the 
City. 59 The Commission believes that such a ban should not only 
prohibit the publi6 offi6ial from asking the person who has 
business dealings with the City to make a contribution, it should 
also prohibit the public official from enlisting that person as a 
solicitor of contributions from others. 
We view with particular alarm the practice of public 
officials who solicit campaign contributions or pledges on a one-
on-one basis from those who have business dealings with the City. 
Such a situation is fraught with the danger that the potential 
contributor will feel coerced into making the contribution 
requested and will believe himself entitled to expect some 
benefit in return. Although the Department of Investigation has 
publicly deplored the practice,60 it flourishes unabated. Only 
an explicit ban can put a stop to it. 
59 The ban on solicitation should extend to all officers 
and partners of the business entity or firm which has business 
dealings with the City. 
60 Anatomy of A Municipal Franchise: New York City Bus 
Shelter Program, 1973-1979 - An Investigative Report, New York 
City Department of Investigation (July 1981), Conclusions p. 13. 
(Comptroller Harrison Goldin's "conduct of knowingly soliciting 
campaign contributions from persons seeking to do business with 
the City •.• gave rise to the appearance of impropriety and 
favoritism"). 
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b. A Ban On Making Or Accepting Contributions 
Under federal law, it is unlawful for "any person who 
enters into any contract with the United States or any department 
or agency thereof either for the rendition of personal services 
or furnishing any material, supplies or equipment .... or for 
selling any land or building •.•. " to make political contribu-
tions.61 The ban begins at the time contract negotiations 
commence and extends until performance under the contract is 
complete. 62 
The Commission urges the adoption of a similar ban for 
those who do business with New York City. To be effective, the 
ban should extend not only, as in the federal law, to those who 
seek to enter into contracts with city agencies for the sale of 
goods or services or leasing of property, but also those who, in 
the course of their business activities, apply for tax abate-
ments, zoning variances and other discretionary benefits63 such 
as the settlement of claims against the City prior to litiga-
61 2 u.s.c. §441(a) (1). 
62 Id. The ban also applies to those whose negotiations with 
the government are unsuccessful and covers the period from 
initiation of negotiations to their termination. 
63 Cf., Deering's California Code Ann. §84308 (1985), which 
restricts the contributions which can be made by "a party, or his 
or her agent, to a proceeding involving a license, permit or 
other entitlement for use pending before any agency." 
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tion.64 The ban should begin, as the federal ban begins, with 
the date bids are first sought or a request for proposals is 
first issued by the relevant agency (in the case of contracts) 
or, in the case of -an application for a discretionary benefit, 
with the date the relevant administrative application is made. 
The ban should extend until twelve months after performance is 
complete under the contract or twelve months after the date the 
application process is concluded and all necessary approvals 
(including those of the Board of Estimate) have been received. 
Under federal law, contributions by employees, 
officers, family members or stockholders of the federal contrac-
tor organization are not restricted.65 Given the ease with which 
large organizations such as law firms and investment banking 
firms are able to "bundle" contributions from partners and 
officers, the Commission believes that New York must go beyond 
the rudimentary strictures of the federal law. Instead, using 
the categories set forth in the Goodman amendment, the ban 
64 Under the City Charter and the New York Administrative 
Code, the Comptroller has the sole discretion to settle claims 
against the City, including major construction claims, before a 
formal lawsuit is instituted. See New York City Charter §93(g); 
N.Y.C. Administrative Code §§7-20l(a) and 7-202. Firms in the 
construction industry contributed over $69,000 to the 
comptroller's re-election bid in 1984 and 1985. 
65 T.J. Schwarz and A.G. Straus, Federal Regulation of 
campaign Finance and Political Activity, vol. 1, §2.04[3][i)[vii] 
at 2-85; see also AO 1984-10, Fed. Elec. camp. Fin. Guide (CCH), 
para. 5760 (April 17, 1984) (although neither a law firm 
providing legal services to a federal agency nor its partners may 
make contributions through a partnership account, partners may 
make contributions in their own names from personal funds.) 
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should extend to corporate officers and business partners of the 
entity doing business with the City. 
D. The Advantages of Incumbency Must Be Curtailed 
Two aspects of the City Campaign Finance Act are of 
concern to the Commission in so far as they promote the advantage 
which incumbents enjoy over their challengers: the failure of 
the Act to curtail off-year fundraising, and the Act's artifi-
cially low limits on expenditures for City Council primary 
races. 
1. Off Year Fundraising 
Fundraising has become a constant preoccupation of 
officeholders. A variety of witnesses have told the Commission 
that there has been a qualitative change in the nature of the 
political fundraising process since the 1970's and that fundrais-
ing by incumbent officeholders now takes place throughout the 
election cycle. 
The success with which incumbent officeholders have 
mined the opportunity for off-year fundraising which incumbency 
affords is illustrated by the following figures. In 1983 and 
1984, the two years which preceded his re-election in 1985, 
Mayor Koch raised $1,011,829 and $1,926,455 respectively. 
Comptroller Harrison Goldin, also an incumbent, raised $253,583 
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and $666,618 in those same two non-election years. 66 
Nor has the Mayor's fundraising effort been on hold 
since the 1985 election. In 1986, the Mayor raised $755,469. In 
1987, he raised $737,152. In those same years, Council President 
Stein raised $154,350 and $174,650 respectively.67 
Comptroller Goldin, with a warchest of approximately 
$1.5 million, has not accepted contributions since March 1986. 
He has, however, hosted a number of fundraising events in the 
last two years, paid for from past campaign contributions. In 
July 1987, for instance, he hosted a party for 170 guests at the 
Metropolitan.Museum of Art, which was paid for by one of his 
campaign committees.68 The Comptroller described the Metropoli-
tan Museum party and other similar events in the following terms: 
[I]t is the practice of many candidates to 
hold fundraisers at least on an annual basis 
to which they sell tickets. I tend not to do 
that. I tend to hold fundraising type 
functions for contributors who have either 
contributed in the past or contributors whom 
I anticipate will contribute in the future 
•... They all understand that it is related 
to fundraising, although there is no direct 
fundraising, necessarily, at the function.69 
66 See Appendix A at pp. 2, 6. 
67 Id. at pp. 2,4. 
68 March 14 Tr. at pp. 114-15. 
69 June Tr. at pp. 210. 
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According to Dr. Herbert Alexander, an election law 
expert familiar with New York city's campaign financing prac-
tices, the capability of well-known and incumbent candidates to 
raise money early and quickly "giv[es) them an unfair edge over 
their lesser-known opponents and perhaps forestall[s) others 
from entering a race altogether. 11 70 Dr. Alexander has pointed out 
that candidates for off ice in New York could be barred from 
accepting contributions earlier than one year before the first 
day to circulate designating petitions for the office which the 
candidate is seeking, i.e., earlier than 15 months before the 
primary election.71 
The Commission urges the amendment of the City's 
Campaign Finance Act to . bar candidates from accepting contribu-
tions more than fifteen months before the primary election. 
Alternatively, the Commission recommends that the Act be amended 
to provide that contributions received more than 15 months prior 
to the election will not be taken into account in determining the 
amount of public funds a candidate is entitled to receive under 
the new public financing system. 
70 Alexander, Herbert E., Options for Election Reform in 
New York City - Report to the New York City Charter Revision 
Commission, October 15, 1987, at 14. 
71 Id. at 15. 
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2. City Council Expenditure Limits 
The Commission also views with concern the $60,000 cap 
imposed by the Act on primary election expenditures in an 
election year by candidates for City Council.7 2 A $60,000 cap is 
far too low to allow meaningful competition in New York City's 
all-important primary elections. Such a low limit favors 
incumbents and will almost certainly have the effect of dis-
couraging City Council challenges. This flies in the face of 
the very purpose of public funding, which is to open the 
political process to outsiders who lack both the financial 
backing and superior name recognition enjoyed by incumbents. 
In our December 1987 report, we recommended that 
expenditure limits for statewide campaigns be set no lower than 
75% .of the highest amounts expended for the office in the last 
three elections.73 Applied to recent City Council races, that 
formula suggests that the $60,000 expenditure limit is much too 
low. For example, in a 1985 race, David Rothenberg spent well 
over $200,000 (three quarters of it in the election year) in a 
strong but ultimately unsuccessful challenge to Councilwoman 
Carol Greitzer. A $60,000 election-year cap might well have 
resulted in no contest at all. 
72 N.Y.C. Admin. Code.§3-706(a). 
73 See December Report, supra n.1, at pp.43-44. 
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IV. The Monitoring of Contributions By Those Who Do 
Business With the City Is Critical 
A. The Board Of Estimate's Primitive Recordkeeping 
Practices Have crippled The Monitoring Of 
Contributions By Those Who Do Business With the City 
The most serious obstacle to the effort to track in any 
systematic way the discretionary benefits awarded to contributors 
has been the primitive state of recordkeeping at the Board of 
Estimate. The public records of the Board are shockingly out of 
date. The Board's Journal of Proceedings which, by law, is 
required to document the business of the Board, has not been 
published since 1981.74 The index to the Journal of Proceedings, 
without which the Journal is all but useless, has not been 
published since 1976.75 There is, in effect, no public record of 
decisions by the Board since the Goodman amendment was enacted. 
Instead, the public must turn to the overworked staff 
of the Bureau of the Secretary of the Board, whose manually 
maintained working files are woefully unsuited to answering even 
the most basic of questions. The Board's records are organized 
chronologically by Board of Estimate calendar date and calendar 
number and not alphabetically by the name of the person or 
business whose matter was voted on by the Board. There is, 
therefore, no ready way to determine how many times in the past 
74 June Tr. at 169-70 & Exh. 36. 
75 Id. at 170 & Exh. 37. 
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three years a given developer/contributor has received a zoning 
variance and which members of the Board voted for and against 
those variances, or how frequently a contract for investment 
advisory services has been awarded to a given investment banking 
firm and which members of the Board voted to approve those 
contracts. Short of embarking upon the laborious and time 
consuming chore of searching through filing cabinets of index 
cards and calendar records, the Board's staff cannot answer such 
fundamental questions. 
When Commission investigators asked the Board to supply 
information on who voted for and against certain recent calendar 
items, they were referred to handwritten, hastily pencilled notes 
in the margins of staff's copies of the Board calendar, which 
only Board staff were capable of deciphering. Commission 
investigators were repeatedly told that there is no indexing 
system which would allow them to track a matter's progress 
through the Board's proceedings. 
The Commission is appalled by the primitive state of 
the Board's records. The Board of Estimate is, after all, "the 
City's most important administrative body and may be considered 
the Board of Directors for the City of New York. 11 76 The 
impenetrability of its records and the concomitant difficulty of 
76 The Board of Estimate (undated) at 1 (on file at the 
Commission). 
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tracing the progress of a matter through the Board's decision-
making process means that any relationship between campaign 
contributions and the Board's decisions is, in most instances, 
effectively hidden -from public view. 
B. Recent Efforts To Update the Board's 
Recordkeeping Practices 
Following the enactment of the Goodman amendment, the 
Board of Estimate passed a resolution requiring all persons with 
business before the Board to file a disclosure document (known as 
Form 333) which is designed to identify those to whom the Goodman 
law's restrictions apply -- persons with business before the 
Board and their partners, corporate officers and five percent 
shareholders.77 
As of the Commission's hearing in June, the information 
contained on Form 333, like the rest of the information at the 
Board, was not organized in any fashion which permitted analysis. 
77 Ironically, the Form 333 promulgated by the Board in 1986 
contained no warning which would have put those with business 
before the Board on notice of their obligation to refrain from 
making contributions in excess of $3,000. Indeed, in November 
1987, when the Commission questioned Corporation Counsel staff 
about the absence of such a warning, the Commission was told that 
the City took the position that it did not make sense to single 
out one provision of the Election Law for inclusion as a warning 
on the form. In May 1988, the Commission was advised that the 
City was in the process of revising Form 333 and that the 
revision would include a warning about the Goodman law's 
contribution limits. 
- 38 -
These key disclosure documents were neither computerized nor even 
alphabetized; it was therefore not possible to find out how 
frequently a given contributor has appeared before the Board. 
Back in November 1986, a computer program which would 
have allowed the Board to computerize the Form 333 information 
and to conduct searches of the Form 333 data base was written by 
staff of the Kingsborough Community College. Although the 
computer program was completed by the spring of 1987 and was 
demonstrated to the City at that time, the Board never imple-
mented it. 
Discussion of the need to computerize the Board's 
records, however, resumed in May 1988. On May 10, 1988 -- one 
month after the Commission sent a letter to each of the eight 
members of the Board of Estimate, asking them to detail what 
measures, if any, were in place to ensure compliance with the 
Goodman amendment -- representatives of the Board met to discuss 
the revamping of Form 333. The following week, on May 16, 1988, 
the Secretary of the Board of Estimate ("the Secretary") 
circulated to Board members a proposal to computerize not only 
the Form 333 information but also the entire operation of the 
Board -- its calendars, resolutions and Journals of Proceedings -
- at a cost of $2 million.78 In early June, the Secretary scaled 
his proposal down to $900,000.79 
78 See June Tr. at 170, Exhibit 41. 
79 Id. at 172-75, Exhibit 42. 
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The Secretary's June 9, 1988 budget proposal was 
striking in several respects. First, the Board acknowledged the 
primitive state of -its own records: 
The Bureau of the Secretary has the mandate 
to maintain the official public records of 
the Board of Estimate, in matters involving 
the expenditure of funds over $10,000. The 
current system of maintaining these records 
is archaic and increasingly in danger of 
collapse due to a growing backlog .••. 
At present, there is no form of automation 
available for tracking, filing and prepara-
tion of the calendar, calendar digest, 
journal, resolutions, correspondence, 333 
information. All procedures are performed 
manually. These manual systems have been in 
place for as long as 30 years or more, and 
depend heavily on the experience and accuracy 
of key personnel. Even for these personnel, 
the procedures are time consuming and 
cumbersome ..•.• 
[A]ll tracking of submission documents is 
manually recorded on index cards. These 
cards must be manually searched for tracking 
information. It is time-consuming both to 
create and maintain these tracking documents 
and to retrieve information from them. 
Backlo~s make the process even more ineff i-
cient. O 
Second, the June 9, 1988 proposal notes that the cost 
of the new equipment required to computerize the Board's 
operations would, in less than two years, be fully offset by 
savings in the cost the Board presently incurs by contracting out 
the printing of the Board's calendar to a commercial printer. 
80 Id. at 173-75, Exhibit 42 at 1, 2. 
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At the Commission's hearing on June 20, 1988, each of 
the three Citywide officeholders pledged their support for the 
modernization of the Board of Estimate records.Bl The Commis-
sion was consequently disappointed to learn that the fiscal year 
1989 budget approved by the City Council and the Board of 
Estimate the following week contained no new appropriation for 
the Board's computerization efforts. 
Following the failure of the City Council and the Board 
of Estimate to include funds for the computerization effort in 
the budget adopted on June 30, 1988, the Commission wrote to each 
of the three Citywide officials to urge them to make such funds 
available immediately. In response, the Mayor assured the 
Commission that he stands by his commitment "to do whatever is 
necessary to modernize the operations of the Secretary's office" 
and that any necessary budget modifications will be submitted to 
the Board of Estimate and city Counci1.82 
The Commission has since been advised that the Board 
has begun to enter information from the Form 333 disclosure 
document into a small personal computer data base and that the 
Secretary plans to release a request for proposals for a turnkey 
computer system, the first phase of which would allow the 
81 June Tr. at so, 126, 176-77. 
82 Letter from Mayor Edward I. Koch to Commission Chairman 
John D. Feerick, dated July 29, 1988 (copy on file at the 
Commission). 
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tracking of information from Form 333. The Commission intends to 
continue to monitor the Board's implementation of these com-
puterization plans. 
V. Conclusion 
Commendably, New York City has taken the first step in 
the direction of ridding election campaigns of the influence of 
large campaign contributions. Yet loopholes relating to loans 
and corporate contributions, and the continued tolerance of the 
iniquitous practice of soliciting and accepting contributions 
from those whose businesses stand to benefit from favorable City 
action undercut the promise of reform held out to New York 
voters. This is no time for half-measures. Genuine campaign 
finance reform at both the state and City levels must banish 
forever the specter of the influence of private business 
interests over the public trust. 
Dated: New York, New York 
September 28, 1988 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT 
INTEGRITY 
John D. Feerick, 
Chairman 
Richard D. Emery 
Patricia M. Hynes 
James L. Magavern 
Bernard s. Meyer 
Bishop Emerson J. Moore 
Cyrus R. Vance 
APPENDIX A 
SUMMARY OF FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE FORMS OF NYC CANDIDATES 
CANDIDATE: Edward I. Koch 
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/11/88 
Jname Dollar No. Expenses Dollar No. 
Amount Count Amount Couit 
Monetary Contributions $7,830,499.14 20,679 Transfers Out $ - 0 - 0 
Non-cash Contributions $ 79,438.97 47 Loan Repayments $ 2,500.00 1 
Loans Received $ 2,500.00 1 Carpaign Expenditures $ 6,570,680.51 15 
Transfers In $ 36,805.21 9 Contribution Refunds $ 91, 154.58 33 
Refunds of C~ign Exp. $ 18,097.48 14 
Other Receipts $ 174,798.97 113 
Final Totals: ss, 142, 139.n 20,863 
CANDIDATE: Harrison J. Goldin 
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88 
Inc~ Dollar No . Expenses Dollar No. 
Amount Coll'lt Amount Count 
Monetary Contributions $2,050,221.45 1, 153 Transfers out $ 553,203.00 17 
Non-cash Contributions $ 500.00 1 Loan Repayments $ 1,000.00 1 
Loans Received $ - 0 - 0 Carpaign Expenditures $1,672,591.93 34 
Transfers In $ 561,000.00 15 Contribution Refunds s 60,500.00 14 
Refunds of C~ign Exp. s 2,516.93 6 
Other Receipts s 501,856.59 74 
Final Totals: $3,116,094.97 1,249 
CANDIDATE: Andrew J. Stein 
Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88 
I~ Dollar No. Expenses Dollar No. 
Amount COll'lt Amount Coll'lt 
Monetary Contributions $2,426,467.50 1,021 Transfers ~t s 159,486.28 254 
Non-cash Contributions s 800.00 4 Loan Repayments s 930, 713.18 45 
Loans Received $1,254,875.00 39 Ca"l'<lign Expenditures $3, 151, 109.98 15 
Transfers In s 85,000.00 14 Contribution Refl.nds $ 22,000 . 00 6 
Refunds of C~ign Exp. $ 4,908.42 10 
Other Receipts $ 2,828.29 11 























CANDIDATE: Edward I. Koch 
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/11/88 
No. 
Total Monetary Contributions COll'lt Year 
$1 ,011,829 .oo 469 1983 
$1,926,454.92 6,006 1984 
$3,268,580.06 12, 194 1985 
s 755,469.18 468 1986 
s 737, 151.98 1,448 1987 
s 131,014.00 94 1988 
Total Monetary Contributions No . 
$100 - $499 Co1..nt Year 
s 18,050.00 79 1983 
s 68,927.92 441 1984 
s 481,308.00 3,201 1985 
s 12,200 . 18 74 1986 
s 25,850.00 165 1987 
s 1,350.00 8 1988 
Total Monetary Contributions No. 
$1,000 - S4,999 Co1..nt Year 
s 376,005.00 233 1983 
s 567,826.00 376 1984 
$1,085,802.00 806 1985 
s 509,002.00 304 1986 
s 662,000.00 361 1987 
s 127,000.00 67 1988 
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Total Monetary Contributions 




s 13, 750. 00 
s 23,499.98 
s 2,250 . 00 
Total Monetary Contributions 




































1986 s 755,469.18 
1987 s 737, 151.98 








CANDIDATE: Edward I. Koch 
INCOME 
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/11/88 
Non Cash 
Other Receipts Contributions Transfers In 
$ 23,062.18 $ - 0 - $ 5,000.00 
$ 93,404.96 $ 10,000.00 $ 17,474.29 
$ 32,613.86 $ 68,434.22 s - 0 -
s 6,712.58 s 1,004. 7S s - 0 -
s 854.06 s 
- 0 - s 11, 198.82 
s 18, 151.33 s - 0 - s 3, 132.00 
EXPENSES 






s - 0 - s - 0 - s 142, 115.00 
s - 0 . s - 0 - s 607,904.00 
s - 0 - s 
- 0 - $4,703,602.00 
s 
- 0 - s - 0 - s 845,997.00 
s 
- 0 - s 2,500.00 s 153,889.00 
s 






























s - 0 . 
s - 0 -
$ 2,500.00 






















CANDIDATE: Andrew J. Stein 
Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88 









Total Monetary Contributions 
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Total Monetary Contributions 
S5,000 and over 



































1984 s - 0 -
1985 S2,050,065.00 
1986 s 154,350.00 
1987 s 174,650.00 








CANDIDATE: Andrew J. Stein 
INCOME 
Filing Period 1/12/85 - 7/11/88 
Non Cash 
Other Receipts Contributions Transfers In 
s 
- 0 - s - 0 - s - 0 -
s 
- 0 - s - 0 - s - 0 -
s - 0 - s - 0 - s - 0 -
s - 0 - s - 0 - s 5,000.00 
s 1, 141.32 s 800.00 s 20,000.00 
s 1,686.97 s - 0 - s 60,000.00 
EXPENSES 







- 0 - s - 0 - s - 0 -
s 
- 0 - s - 0 - s - 0 -
s 48,336.66 s 476,075.34 S2,898,688.00 
s 14,769.50 s 432,609.50 s 95,915.00 
s 30,047.12 s 5,369.27 s 102,043.00 








































CANDIDATE: Harrison J. Goldin 
Filing Period 1/15/83 - 7/15/88 
No. Total Monetary Contributions No. 
Year Total Monetary Contributions CoU1t Year Lllder $100 Count 
1983 $ 253,583.00 56 1983 $ - 0 - 0 
1984 $ 666,616.57 280 1984 $ 1, 149.90 18 
1985 $1,092,521.88 799 1985 $ 5,027.02 119 
1986 s 32,500.00 17 1986 s 25.00 1 
1987 s 5,000.00 1 1987 $ - 0 - 0 
1988 s - 0 - 0 1988 $ - 0 - 0 
' 
Total Monetary Contributions No. Total Monetary Contributions No. 
Year $100 - $499 COU1t Year $500 - $999 Count 
1983 s 250.00 1 1983 $ 2,000.00 4 
1984 s 8,000.00 39 1984 $ 14,500.00 29 
1985 s 65,269.90 311 1985 $ 49,400.00 98 
1986 s 2,975.00 8 1986 $ - 0 - 0 
1987 $ 
- 0 - 0 1987 $ - 0 - 0 
1988 $ 
- 0 - 0 1988 $ - 0 - 0 
. 
Total Monetary Contributions No. Total Monetary Contributions No. 
Year $1,000 - S4,999 Coll1t Year $5,000 and over Count 
1983 $ 46,000.00 24 1983 s 205,333.00 27 
1984 s 260,300.00 136 1984 $ 382,666.67 58 
1985 s 269,824.99 175 1985 s 702,999.97 96 
1986 s 9,500.00 5 1986 $ 20,000.00 3 
1987 s 
- 0 - 0 1987 $ 5,000.00 1 
1988 s 













S1, 092, 521.88 
s 32,500.00 
s 5,000.00 








CANDIDATE: Harrison J. Goldin 
INCOME 






s 92, 126.44 
s 222,959.46 
s 66, 179.65 
Non cash 
Contributions 












Transfers In Expenditures 
s 500.00 s - 0 -
s 70,500.00 s - 0 -
$165,000.00 s 1,090.98 
S150,000.00 s 1,425.95 
s 50,000.00 s - 0 -
S125,000.00 s - 0 -








s 12,598.00 s 1,000.00 s 50,242.46 s - 0 -
s 64,605.00 s - 0 - s 79,749.74 s 28,500.00 
s 150,000.00 s 
- 0 - s 967,836.71 s 12,000.00 
s 151,000.00 s - 0 • s 183,544.19 s 20,000.00 
s 50,000.00 s • 0 • s 210,458.29 s - 0 -
s 125,000.00 s 







s - 0 -
s - 0 -
s 
- 0 -
s - 0 -
APPENDIX B 
WITNESSES APPEARING AT COMMISSION HEARINGS 
ON CAMPAIGN FINANCE PRACTICES 
March 14, 1988 
Gerald M. Leyy, Chief investigator, New York State 
Commission on Government Integrity 
Lawrence Mandelker, Campaign treasurer for New York 
City, Mayor Edward I. Koch 
John Gold, Campaign treasurer for New York City 
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin. 
Laura Schwed, Personal assistant to John Gold 
Diana Hoffman, Appointment secretary for New York City 
Comptroller Harrison J. Goldin 
Joseph Bernstein, President, New York Land Company 
Philip Friedman, Campaign manager for New York City 
Council President Andrew J. stein 
William Zeckendorf, Chief executive officer, Zeckendorf 
Company, Inc. 
Gerald Guterman, President, Hanover Companies Inc. 
Donald Trump, President, The Trump Organization 
Richard Halperin, Senior Vice-President, Special 
Counsel to the Chairman, McAndrews & Forbes 
Group, Inc. 
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March 15, 1988 
Richard Daddario, Senior assistant counsel, New York 
State Commission of Investigation 
Richard Tenenini, Former associate accountant, New York 
State Board of Elections 
Thomas Wallace, Executive director, New . York State 
Board of Elections. 
William Stern, Campaign chairman for New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo (1982) 
Ethan Geto, Campaign director and treasurer for New 
York Attorney General Robert Abrams 1986 campaign. 
Richard Gordon, Campaign director for New York 
· Governor Mario Cuomo (1986) 
Robert Taylor, Campaign treasurer for New York 
Governor Mario Cuomo 
Lawrence Buttenwieser, Finance Chairman for New York 
State Attorney General Robert Abrams 
Robert Pressman, Executive Vice President, Barney's New 
York 
Donald Zucker, Donald Zucker Co. 
Bruce Eichner, President, Eichner Properties 
Lawrence Huntington, Campaign chairman for New York 
State Comptroller Edward V. Regan 
John Marino, Executive director of the New York State 
Democratic Committee; former chief executive 
officer of the Friends of Mario Cuomo; fundraiser 
for New York State Lieutenant Governor Stan 
Lundine 
David Schulz, Campaign treasurer for New York 
Lieutenant Governor Stan Lundine 
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June 20, 1988 
The Honorable Edward I. Koch, Mayor of the City of New 
York 
The Honorable Andrew J. Stein, New York City council 
President 
The Honorable Harrison J. Goldin, New York City 
Comptroller 
Howard J. Rubenstein, President, Howard J. Rubenstein 
Associates, Inc. 
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